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1. Introduction 
The role of family firms in the economy has been a widely debated issue in the academic lit-
erature. In The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Chandler 
1977) and Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Chandler 1990), Chan-
dler argues that large firms run by a cadre of salaried managers are managed better and care 
more about their long-term competitive advantage than “personal enterprises”, that is, those 
“firms managed by individuals or by a small number of associates, often members of foun-
der’s families, assisted by only a few salaried managers” (Chandler 1990). Chandler, among 
others, attributes Britain’s industrial decline relative to the U.S. and Germany before World 
War II to the strong persistence of family firms in that country.1 He further argues that the 
shift toward salaried managers running large enterprises is responsible for the growth and 
strength of U.S. industries in the early years of modern capitalism (1850-1920). Referring to 
British family firms, Chandler states that their “goal […] appears to have been to provide a 
steady flow of cash flow to owners – owners who were also managers” (1990). Short-term 
income was preferred to long-term growth, dividend payments were high and retained earn-
ings were low. By contrast, “in American managerial firms the basic goals appear to have 
been long-term profit and growth” (Chandler 1990). Chandler argues that salaried managers 
are more capable of dealing with “dividend-hungry owners” than managers who are also 
members of the ownership family because the latter are more vulnerable to pressure from 
family members who are not involved in the business and who therefore favour high divi-
dends.  
Other scholars go even further than Chandler, arguing that family firm owners engage in po-
litical rent seeking; thus, these owners have a negative effect on economic development 
(Morck and Yeung 2004). Similar arguments have been advanced by Fogel (2006), who finds 
                                                 
1  This argument has been criticized by some business historians for overstating the number of family firms in 
Britain while understating the number of family firms in the U.S. For criticism from various perspectives, 
see, e.g., Alford (1994), Church et al. (1990), Church (1993). 
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that greater oligarchic family control of large enterprises is associated with negative social 
economic outcomes. Wealthy families are argued to allocate capital inefficiently and prefer to 
maintain the status quo rather than invest in innovation and growth (Morck, Wolfenzon, and 
Yeung 2005). 
In his work The Competitive Advantage of Nations (Porter 1998), Porter presents a different 
perspective. He argues that the U.S. system of allocating investment capital is failing (Porter 
1992). U.S. firms invest too little in the assets and capabilities required for competitiveness, 
including research and development (R&D), employee training, and supplier relations. This 
underinvestment places U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to German or Japa-
nese firms. The main reason for underinvestment is the short-term relationship between U.S. 
firms and external capital providers. Approximately 60% of the total equity of large U.S. 
firms is owned by institutional investors who have highly diversified portfolios with only 
small stakes in each firm. The average holding time of shares is only 1.9 years. Such inves-
tors, therefore, focus on financial goals over the short term. They base their investment choic-
es on limited information oriented toward predicting short-term stock price movements, and 
they focus on easily measurable figures such as current earnings. This is not the situation in 
Japan or Germany. Porter argues that firms in these two countries have ‘dedicated owners’ 
who act as principals rather than as agents. These owners “hold significant stakes, rather than 
small fragmented positions […] and seek long-term appreciation of their shares, which they 
hold in perpetuity” (Porter 1992). Although Porter did not explicitly refer to family owners as 
a group, family owners resemble, in many aspects, Porter’s group of dedicated owners.2 In 
particular, family owners possess the desire to pass the firm on to the next generation, leading 
these owners to think of the long term (Casson 1999; Guzzo and Abbott 1990; James 1999; 
Tagiuri and Davis 1992). For these and other reasons explained below, scholars in the fields 
                                                 
2  Other important block holders in Germany have been banks and insurance companies. In Japan, suppliers 
and customers own large stakes in each other to cement their business relationship. 
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of business history (e.g., Berghoff 2006; Casson 1999), economics and finance (e.g., 
Anderson and Reeb 2003; Bertrand and Schoar 2006; James 1999), and management (e.g., Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller 2006; Lumpkin, Brigham, and Moss 2010; Zellweger 2007) argue 
that family firms are more oriented toward the long term than non-family firms.  
The empirical studies to date have analysed the effects of family ownership on innovation and 
growth on the firm level (e.g., Block 2010b; Casillas and Moreno 2010; Chen and Hsu 2009; 
Munari, Oriani, and Sobrero 2010). Despite the extensive discussion in the literature about the 
role of family firms in the economy, there are few empirical papers about the macroeconomic 
or regional effects of ownership structure (Gatti 2009). To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is the first to analyse the impact of family firms on regional innovation activity. Using a 
dataset of 326 German districts (Kreise, NUTS 3-level), we find a positive relationship be-
tween the share of family firms in a particular region and the innovation activity in that re-
gion. Innovation activity is measured by the number of successful patent applications (Acs 
and Audretsch 1989; Ejermo 2009). To avoid confounding the effects of family capitalism 
with other determinants of regional innovation activity (Fritsch and Slavtchev 2008; 
Koschatzky and Sternberg 2000), we include several controls in our regressions, such as re-
gional industry structure, regional levels of human capital, start-up activity and R&D invest-
ments. Hence, the key result of our study is that the higher the family firm intensity in a par-
ticular region, the greater the innovation activity in that region. Prior research suggests that a 
higher level of regional innovation activity shall also have a positive effect on regional eco-
nomic development (Aghion and Howitt 1992; Audretsch and Thurik 2001; Romer 1990; 
Schumpeter 1942; Vaz and Nijkamp 2009). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 conceptualizes the link between 
family capitalism and regional innovation activity. Section 3 describes the context of our em-
pirical study, the German Mittelstand. Section 4 introduces the data and the methods used in 
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the empirical analysis. A map illustrates regional family firm and patenting intensity in Ger-
many. Section 5 provides the regression results and a number of robustness checks. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes and discusses implications for theory and practice. 
 
2. Family capitalism and its effect on regional innovation activity 
2.1 Regional innovation systems 
We shall use the concept of regional innovation systems to conceptualize the link be-
tween family capitalism and regional innovation activity. The concept of regional innovation 
systems can be used to explain patterns and processes of innovation at the regional level (Acs 
2000; Cooke 2001). A regional innovation system can be described as a system in which 
firms and other organizations learn systematically and interactively through an institutional 
environment of a particular region (Cooke, Uranga, and Etxebarria 1998). The institutional 
environment leads firms to accept common norms, values, expectations, attitudes and prac-
tices (Gertler, Wolfe, and Garkut 2000). Different factors are found to support the develop-
ment of regional innovation systems. Most importantly for our paper, innovation is regarded 
as a social process; innovation is the result of constant interaction among different economic 
actors (Dosi 1988; Edquist 1997). These actors include (small and large) firms, universities 
and research institutes, technology transfer agencies, local government, and (public and pri-
vate) funding institutions (Cooke, Gomez Uranga, and Etxebarria 1997). Frequent and con-
stant interaction among these actors favours the development of regional innovation networks, 
clusters and research cooperatives (Asheim 2002). A cooperative culture, learning orientation 
and quest for consensus have a positive impact on the potential of regional innovation sys-
tems, whereas a competitive culture, individualism and a ‘not invented here’ attitude have a 
negative impact (Cooke 2001). At the organizational level of the firm, Cooke (2001) further 
argues that firms with trusting labour relations, shop floor cooperation, worker welfare orien-
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tation and openness to external knowledge favour the development of regional innovation 
systems. In particular, through bi- and multilateral cooperation with universities and other 
research institutes, firms can gain access to basic knowledge and competencies outside their 
own domain. Prior studies suggest positive effects of R&D cooperation on innovation and 
firm performance (Becker and Dietz 2004; De Propris 2002; Faems, Van Looy, and 
Debackere 2005; Okamuro 2007). 
 
2.2 The role of family firms in regional innovation systems 
Family firms differ from non-family firms regarding their levels of long-term orienta-
tion and local embeddedness. Both aspects lower the transaction and coordination costs of 
research cooperatives (Becker and Dietz, 2004; Okamuro, 2007). As a result, research coop-
eratives become more likely and more lasting, and the probability for a productive regional 
innovation system increases. 
One of the great attributes of family firms is their ability to think of the long term. 
Dedicated family firm owners aim to transfer ownership from one generation to the next 
(James 1999; Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2006). Following this goal, family firm owners 
care more about the firm’s long-term perspective than other owners do; they do not strive to 
maximize the firm’s short-term profits. Long-term orientation is important for innovation. 
The fruits of research and innovation are uncertain and risky and often occur years after the 
investments in innovation have been made (Scherer 1998; Scherer and Harhoff 2000). In oth-
er words, the costs of innovation are incurred in the near term, whereas the payoffs from in-
novation are likely to occur only over the long term. This situation can lead to a problem of 
managerial myopia in which an underinvestment in R&D may occur (Hall 2002; Narayanan 
1985). As noted above, successful research cooperatives require a long-term perspective. A 
longer time horizon leads to a decrease in transaction and coordination costs for the research 
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cooperatives (Becker and Dietz 2004; Okamuro 2007). Family firm owners, as ‘dedicated 
owners’ (Porter 1992; Porter 1998), will seek to develop lasting research cooperatives with 
other local firms and organizations. Their strong degree of long-term orientation also makes 
family firms attractive partners for research cooperatives. For example, in times of financial 
stress, family firms are considered reliable cooperative partners that are less likely to cut in-
vestments in research and end promising cooperatives. Because of their local roots and their 
strong ties to local partners, they are also less likely than other firms to act opportunistically. 
Our second argument refers to the social interrelation between family firms and their 
regional environment. We argue that family firm owners have stronger ties to their local envi-
ronments and are thus more locally embedded relative to other firm owners (Astrachan 1988; 
Block 2010b; Déniz and Suárez 2005). Most family firm owners grew up in the region in 
which their firm is located. They are well known to the local community in which their firm is 
located and, over the years, the families have developed strong relationships with the regions 
in which they live. As with long-term orientation, local roots and a strong embeddedness in 
the region help to identify valuable sources of knowledge and strengthen the regional system 
of innovation, which then leads to a higher level of innovation activity (Cooke, 2001). 
 
3. Background: The German “Mittelstand” 
To understand the context of our study, a short introduction to the term Mittelstand 
and its characteristics is provided. The term Mittelstand dates back to the Middle Ages when 
the German word Stand described an individual’s socio-economic status. Three levels of sta-
tus were distinguished: clergy, nobility and stand, the bourgeoisie and the farmers. Later, the 
bourgeoisie were called Mittelstand to differentiate them from the farmers (Meyer-Stamer and 
Wältring 2000). Today, the term Mittelstand is often associated with the German 
Wirtschaftswunder (Germany’s post-war economic success) and the success of the German 
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economy in general (Simon 1996). The Mittelstand was crucial to the development of struc-
turally weak regions such as Bavaria and Hesse in post-war times (Ambrosius 1996). The 
Mittelstand is closely intertwined with the Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy), 
which focuses on both social and market principles, stresses close bank-industry relationships 
and favours a system of private sector governance (Vitols 1997). In contrast to Germany, for 
example, France favoured the development of large firms (so-called national champions) and 
indicative planning (Parker 1999). International comparisons provide evidence for the high 
degree of importance of the Mittelstand in the German economy. Acs and Audretsch (1993, 
Table 12.1), for example, find that in the U.S., firms with fewer than 500 employees account 
for 35.2% of manufacturing employment; the share in the UK is 39.9%, and the share in Ger-
many is 57.9% (Fritsch 1993). In a similar vein, Klein (2000) reports that close to 60% of all 
companies in Germany can be categorized as family firms.3 
What constitutes the typical Mittelstand firm? The term Mittelstand is often used with 
regard to medium-sized firms. However, to focus only on firm size as the defining characteris-
tic falls short of an adequate description of the typical Mittelstand firm and may even be mis-
leading. The corporate governance and socio-cultural factors, rather than the firm size (meas-
ured by number of employees or number of sales), describe the typical Mittelstand firm 
(Berghoff 2006). The large majority of Mittelstand firms are family-owned and/or family-
managed. The management and control functions are usually combined, either assumed by 
one person or carried out by several persons belonging to the same family (Berghoff 2006). 
Thus, in contrast to large, publicly quoted firms, managers and owners in a Mittelstand firm 
are usually independent from the stock market and its influences. Because of their private 
ownership structure, many (relatively) large family firms that are market leaders in their re-
spective fields still see themselves as part of the Mittelstand. 
                                                 
3  Faccio and Lang (2002), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) and Maury (2006) provide further 
international comparisons. 
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The factors that contribute to the success of the Mittelstand are its long-term orienta-
tion, its embeddedness in the region, its close contact to customers, and its constant focus on 
innovation (Böttcher and Linnemann 2008; Simon 2009). Typical Mittelstand firms tend to 
concentrate on profitable niche markets in which high quality and customer-specified prod-
ucts are demanded (Berghoff 2006). In this regard, the term hidden champions has also been 
used. The term describes firms that are less well known to the public yet are very successful. 
They are often market leaders in their respective markets and almost always belong to the 
Mittelstand (Simon 2009). They employ approximately 2,000 people, and their key success 
factor is the high motivation of the employees, which is a result of a high degree of identifica-
tion with the firm and its business. Over the last ten years, several hidden champions have 
grown and turned into large firms. As with other firms, they have internationalized their busi-
ness and created many jobs abroad (Simon 2009). Their roots, however, are still in Germany 
and their respective region. 
 
4. Data and method 
4.1 Data sources and sample 
Our units of observation and our sample are the 326 districts (Kreise) in West Ger-
many (excluding West Berlin) in the year 2004 (NUTS 3-level). We restrict our analysis to 
West Germany because most of the East German districts are not comparable to West German 
districts in terms of firm structure (Kronthaler 2005). The centrally planned economy in so-
cialist East Germany between 1945 and 1989 did not lead to an East German Mittelstand 
(Kaiser 1990). In fact, many family firms were taken over by the state and transformed into 
state-owned firms. In the robustness checks section, we show the results of regressions that 
combine East and West German data. The results are very similar. 
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For the 326 West German districts, we collected data such as regional population den-
sity, employment level and regional industry structure. The information is available from the 
Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning in Germany (Bundesamt für Bauwesen 
und Raumordnung). Additional regional data about regional firm density and start-up rate are 
included and were obtained from the Gründungsatlas (Fritsch and Brixy 2004). To measure 
regional innovation activity, we used the OECD REGPAT database to construct regional pat-
ent count variables (Maraut et al. 2008). REGPAT was created by the OECD and provides 
comprehensive information on patent applications. The data are linked to regions according to 
the inventor’s and applicant's locations and can be categorized by the application and grant 
year. REGPAT relies on European Patent Office (EPO) data. For Germany, more than 99% of 
all patent applications are linked to a particular district. 
Regional family firm density is calculated using data from the Amadeus Database 
(Bureau van Dijk 2010). The database includes all stock market-listed firms in Europe (42 
countries) as well as the 250,000 largest European firms in terms of sales and assets. To ob-
tain the proportion of family firms in the respective region, we focus on firms in which a fam-
ily owns at least 25% of the equity (base year 2004).4 The Amadeus Database reports the per-
centages of ownership of individual investors or families in the respective firms. The database 
reports also the locations of the headquarters. A manual search on the company websites and 
in the encyclopaedia of German family firms (Langenscheidt et al. 2009) was conducted to 
exclude firms owned by private equity investors or founders (Block 2010a; Miller et al. 2007; 
Scholes et al. 2009). Finally, to concentrate on firms in research-intensive industries, we con-
sider only firms in textile mills (SIC 22), chemicals (SIC 28), fabricated metals (SIC 34), in-
dustrial machinery (SIC 35), electronics (SIC 36), transportation equipment (SIC 37), in-
                                                 
4  The legal structure is not a criterion. Moreover, the database includes both private and publicly listed fam-
ily firms (Westhead and Howorth 2007). 
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struments (SIC 38), manufacturing (SIC 39) and communications (SIC 48). In sum, the se-
lected family firms can be considered typical examples of the German Mittelstand. 
The next section provides a detailed description of the family firms included in the 
sample. 
 
4.2 Family firm data 
We identified 513 West German family firms in innovative industries. The median 
firm has 173.5 employees (mean: 192.5 employees) and sales of €27.7 million (mean: €33.9 
million). Many firms are active in the industrial machinery (SIC 35; 160 observations) and 
fabricated metals industry (SIC 34; 150 observations). Electronics (SIC 36) ranks third with 
70 observations. Regarding the legal form, 249 firms are organized as GmbH & Co KG,5 193 
firms as GmbH,6 34 firms as KG, and 30 firms as AG. Only 16 firms are publicly quoted. In 
sum, these numbers show the representation of the family firm data for the population of 
German family firms or the German Mittelstand (Klein 2000). 
 
4.3 Geographic distribution of family firms and innovation activity in West Germany 
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of family firms in Germany. To this end, 
we calculate the family firm intensity per district (number of family firms per 10,000 inhabi-
tants). There exists considerable variation in the number of family firms per district. A high 
family firm intensity exists, for example, in North Rhine Westphalia, where several districts 
have a family firm intensity larger than 0.3 (e.g., Märkischer Kreis, Olpe, Solingen, and Ha-
gen). Among the 20 districts with the highest family firm intensity in Germany, 7 districts are 
located in North Rhine Westphalia. Additionally, there are several regions in Bavaria and 
Baden-Württemberg that indicate a family firm intensity larger than 0.3. In contrast to North 
                                                 
5  GmbH & Co KG is the German abbreviation for a limited partnership with a limited liability company as 
general partner. 
6  GmbH is the German abbreviation for a limited partnership. 
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Rhine Westphalia, the family firm distribution in Baden-Württemberg is more homogeneous. 
In Bavaria, several districts do not include any family firms at all (e.g., Deggendorf, Mies-
bach, Amberg, and Freyung-Grafenau). 
Figure 2 depicts the geographic distribution of innovation activity in Germany as 
measured by the patenting intensity per district (number of successful patent applications per 
10,000 inhabitants). As with the family firm intensity, there exists substantial regional varia-
tion in patenting intensity. In general, the patenting intensity is higher in the south than in the 
north of Germany. The result is mostly driven by the two federal states of Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg. The latter state shows the highest patenting intensity around the district of 
Rottweil in the southwest and in the strip from Stuttgart to Mannheim. In Bavaria, a high pat-
enting intensity can be found in the districts of Ingolstadt, Augsburg, Garmisch-
Partenkirchen and Munich. Apart from the south of Germany, a high patenting intensity can 
also be found in North Rhine Westphalia, in particular in the districts of Gütersloh, Oberber-
gischer Kreis, Mettmann, and Leverkusen. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Figures 1 and 2 here 
------------------------------------- 
4.4 Variables 
4.4.1 Dependent variable 
The number of granted patents in the respective district is used as a proxy to measure 
regional levels of innovation activity. We use the applicant’s location rather than the inven-
tor’s location to determine the respective district.7 The applicant is usually a firm and not an 
individual person. As a basis for time, we use the application year of the granted patent. The 
                                                 
7  The regression results may deviate because the inventor is not necessarily living in the same district as the 
firm in which s/he works. In 2001, the mean distance between the home and the employer was 17 kilometers 
(Kloas and Kuhfeld 2003). 
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time lag between the application year and the year in which the patent is granted is approxi-
mately four years (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2005). We use the application and not the 
granted year because we are interested in the innovation activity that leads to the patent appli-
cation and not the legal process that follows. 
In addition to the absolute number of patents per district, we calculate a patenting in-
tensity variable (patenting intensity) by dividing the number of patents per district by the 
number of inhabitants in that district. 
 
4.4.2 Independent variables 
Our main independent variables are those concerning family firms. To allocate the 
family firms to a particular district, the zip code from the company’s headquarters is used and 
assigned to one of the 326 districts. The variable family firm intensity refers to the number of 
family firms in a particular district divided by the number of inhabitants in that district. 
To isolate the effect of family firm intensity on regional innovation activity, we in-
clude a number of control variables in our regressions, which have been used in prior research 
regarding the determinants of regional innovation activity (Fritsch and Falck 2007; Kronthaler 
2005). Most importantly, we aim to control for the effect of large firms on regional innovation 
activity by constructing the variable large public firm intensity, which refers to the respective 
number of firms in the German stock market indices DAX, MDax, SDAX, and TechDAX 
divided by the number of inhabitants in that district. Further control variables are the follow-
ing: the district population is measured by the number of inhabitants (inhabitants); the vari-
able population balance shows how the population changes between 2002 and 2007. Fur-
thermore, the variables GDP per employed person and household income (in €) refer to the 
economic situation in the various districts. Start-up rate indicates the entrepreneurial activity 
in a given region and can be seen as a mechanism of how knowledge spillovers are used 
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(Audretsch and Feldman 2004). Firm density reports the total number of firms per square kil-
ometre. The variables unemployment rate, industry structure and R&D employee rate are in-
cluded in the regression to control for local labour market characteristics. The variable student 
rate shows how many students are enrolled at a university divided by the district’s number of 
inhabitants and is used as an indicator for human resources and potential firm-university 
knowledge spillovers. Finally, nine industry intensity variables are calculated as the number 
of firms in the particular industry divided by the total number of firms in that particular dis-
trict. Table 1 explains the construction of our variables in detail. 
------------------------------------- 
Table 1 here 
------------------------------------- 
 
4.4.3. Method 
The level of innovation activity is measured through granted patents. The variable 
number of granted patents has a count-data character, i.e., the outcome is a non-negative inte-
ger variable. To that end, three different regression models are estimated. First, we use an 
ordinary OLS model with the natural logarithm of number of granted patents as the dependent 
variable. The logarithm used as the distribution of the variable number of granted patents is 
strongly skewed and non-normal (kurtosis is 127). Second, to address the count-data charac-
ter, a negative binomial regression is estimated. A poisson regression cannot be used as the 
likelihood ratio tests indicate a strong overdispersion (p<0.01) (Verbeek 2008). Third, we 
estimate an OLS regression using the natural logarithm of patenting intensity as the dependent 
variable. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive analysis 
The following descriptive results apply to 326 districts in West Germany. There are, 
on average, 18.4 granted patents per district. However, the distribution is highly skewed: the 
kurtosis is 127.5 (skewness is 10.2) and the median is 7 patents. The variable patenting inten-
sity is calculated by dividing the number of granted patents per district by the number of in-
habitants in that district. The variable shows a mean of 0.76. That is, on average, 0.8 patents 
are granted per 10,000 inhabitants. The highest number can be found in Ludwigshafen am 
Rhein (9.6 granted patents per 10,000 inhabitants), which is not surprising; BASF, one of the 
world’s largest chemical companies, has its headquarters in that district. 
The variable family firm intensity shows an average of 0.07 family firms per 10,000 
inhabitants. Of the 326 districts, 112 do not contain any of the 513 identified family firms. 
The highest family firm density can be found in the district of Märkischer Kreis, Northrhine-
Westphalia (0.78 family firms per 10,000 inhabitants). 
In regards to the control variables, the following results stand out. The average number 
of inhabitants is 201,500. The population decreased by an average of 17 inhabitants between 
2002 and 2007. The variables household income, unemployment rate, start-up rate and indus-
try structure show a normal distribution, whereas the variables GDP per employed person, 
firm density, R&D employee rate, student rate and innovation programs are skewed. Table 2 
shows descriptive statistics. 
------------------------------------- 
Table 2 here 
------------------------------------- 
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5.2 Multivariate regression results 
Table 4 shows OLS regressions for log (patents) and log (patenting intensity) as the 
dependent variables and a negative binomial regression for number of patents as the depend-
ent variable. Table 3 shows a correlation matrix and the variance inflation factors (VIFs). The 
highest VIF is 2.01 (variable household income). The dependent variables in the regressions 
refer to the patenting activity in the respective region, our measures of regional innovation 
activity. To summarize our main result, the regressions show that regional family firm inten-
sity has a positive influence on regional patenting activity. 
Using log (number of granted patents) as the dependent variable, the variable family 
firm intensity shows a significant positive effect (Model I: β=1.04, p<0.05). That is, increas-
ing the family firm intensity from 0.1 to 0.2 leads to a 10% increase in granted patents. When 
using log (patenting intensity) as the dependent variable, the effects are similar; the variable 
family firm intensity shows a significant positive effect (Model III: β=0.40, p<0.05). 
A number of control variables show significant results. The variables GDP per em-
ployed person, firm density, and R&D employee rate have a significant positive effect on re-
gional patenting activity. A higher unemployment rate shows a significant negative effect 
(Model I: β=-0.05, p<0.05; Model II: β=-0.06, p<0.05; Model III: β=-0.03, p<0.01). The vari-
able household income has a significant positive effect in Model II, and the variable student 
rate shows a significant positive effect in Models I and II. Thus, a high level of education is 
positively associated with high regional innovation activity (Acs and Audretsch 1989). The 
variable start-up rate has a significant negative effect in Model II (β=-0.39, p<0.05). The vari-
able innovation programs does not show significant effects in any of the models. Finally, the 
regions with a large share of firms in the chemicals and industrial machinery industries record 
a higher level of patenting activity than other regions. In sum, the results regarding the control 
variables confirm the results of previous studies regarding the determinants of regional inno-
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vation activity (Acs, Anselin, and Varga 2002; Buesa et al. 2006; Fritsch and Slavtchev 2008; 
Koschatzky and Sternberg 2000). 
------------------------------------- 
Table 4 here 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
We conducted two robustness checks (see Table 5 for an overview). First, we changed 
the size of the sample and included the districts from former East Germany (increasing the 
sample size from 326 to 438 districts). Second, we excluded districts with more than 500,000 
inhabitants. The results of the two robustness checks are similar to the results of our main 
analyses (Table 4). The variable family firm intensity indicates a significant positive influence 
of regional family firm intensity on the level of patenting activity. 
------------------------------------- 
Table 5 here 
------------------------------------- 
 
6. Conclusions 
To summarize, our regressions show a positive relationship between regional family 
firm concentration and regional innovation activity while controlling for alternative explana-
tions such as regional firm density and industry structure as well as levels of knowledge spill-
overs, entrepreneurship and human capital (Buesa et al. 2006; Fritsch and Slavtchev 2008; 
Koschatzky and Sternberg 2000). This result holds for various model specifications and 
changes in the family firm data used to calculate the family firm intensity variable. 
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This paper’s findings refute the idea that family firms have a negative effect on eco-
nomic development, as suggested by many prior works (e.g., Chandler 1977, 1990; Fogel 
2006; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung 2005; Morck and Yeung 2004). To the contrary, our 
findings suggest that family firms have a positive impact regarding regional economic devel-
opment. To the best of our knowledge, our study is one of the first studies to analyse the ef-
fect of family firm intensity on a macro-level variable, namely regional innovation activity. 
Most prior research in the field of family business has been conducted at the level of the firm. 
This is surprising given the extensive discussion in the literature about the effects of family 
firms on the economy as a whole. Several avenues for further research exist. For example, it 
may be interesting to analyse the effects of family firm concentration on regional wealth or 
income disparity. 
Our study points toward a family firm innovation paradox: on the firm level, past re-
search has found that family ownership is associated with lower levels of innovation input 
that are measured by the degree of R&D spending (Block 2010a; Chen and Hsu 2009; 
Munari, Oriani, and Sobrero 2010) and lower levels of innovation output that are measured by 
the number of patents and patent citations (Block et al. 2010). The results of this paper, how-
ever, go in a different direction. Using regional level data, we find that family firms have a 
positive effect on regional innovation activity. We explain that this positive effect is due to 
family firms being more long-term oriented and more locally embedded than other types of 
firms (Astrachan 1988; Block 2010b; Déniz and Suárez 2005; e.g., Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller 2006; Lumpkin, Brigham, and Moss 2010; Zellweger 2007). Through their local em-
beddedness and long-term orientation, family firms constitute attractive and reliable research 
partners for local institutions such as universities, research institutes or other small and large 
firms. We argue that family firm concentration favours the development of regional innova-
tion systems (Cooke 2001; Cooke, Uranga, and Etxebarria 1998), thus having a positive effect 
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on regional innovation activity. Further research is needed to explain the discrepancy between 
the differing effects of family ownership at the regional and firm levels. For example, it may 
be that family firms have a stronger community orientation and act less opportunistically in 
research cooperatives than do other firms, suggesting that they patent less on their own and 
are more willing to share the fruits of their joint research with their cooperative partners. It 
may also be that family firms rely more on other mechanisms, such as secrecy, to appropriate 
rents from innovation (Arundel 2001). More detailed research about the innovation strategies 
of family firms and their embeddedness in the local environment may shed more light on this 
issue. 
The results of our study can help policy makers at the regional and national levels to 
develop successful innovation and growth strategies (Landabaso 1997; Landabaso and Reid 
1999). From a policy perspective, family firms constitute attractive partners. Contrary to 
many large multinational firms, family firms are proud of their local roots and want to be 
strongly embedded in the local economy. The strong interrelation between the family firm and 
the local economy can lead to synergies in the creation and exploitation of innovation. Re-
gional innovation policy may take advantage of these characteristics of family firms and pro-
mote networks between family firms and other institutions of regional innovation, such as 
universities, public research institutes, technology transfer agencies and innovation funding 
agencies. Creating an intensive and sustainable network between the Mittelstand and the local 
economy may constitute an effective innovation policy. 
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Tables to be inserted in the text 
 
Table 1: Description of variables 
Variable  Description Data source 
    
Number of granted patents
 
Number of granted patents based on application year 
and applicant location (based on grant year or inventor 
location for robustness checks) 
Maraut et al. (2008) 
Log (number of granted 
patents) 
 Natural logarithm of (number of granted patents + 1) Maraut et al. (2008) 
Patenting intensity  Number of granted patents divided by inhabitants (in 
10,000) 
Maraut et al. (2008) 
Log (patenting intensity)  Natural logarithm of (patenting intensity +1) Maraut et al. (2008) 
Family firm intensity  Number of family firms per inhabitants (in 10,000) Bureau van Dijk (2010) 
Large public firm intensity  Number of public firms that are listed in one of the 
German stock market indices (DAX, MDax, SDAX, 
TechDAX) divided by inhabitants (in 10,000) 
Deutsche Börse Group (2004) 
Inhabitants  Number of inhabitants (in 10,000) Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning (2009) 
Population balance  Difference between inhabitants in 2007 and 2002 di-
vided by inhabitants (in 100) in 2002 
Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning (2009) 
GDP/employed person  Gross domestic product per employed person in €1,000 Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning (2009) 
Household income  Household income in € per inhabitant Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning (2009) 
Unemployment rate  Number of unemployed persons divided by employed 
persons (in 100) 
Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning (2009) 
Start-up rate  Number of start-ups divided by inhabitants (in 1,000) Fritsch and Brixy (2004) 
Firm density  Number of firms divided by district area (in km²) Fritsch and Brixy (2004), 
Statistische Ämter des Bundes 
und der Länder (2010) 
R&D employee rate 
 
Number of R&D employees divided by total employees 
(in 1,000) 
Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning (2009) 
Students rate  Number of students enrolled at a university divided by 
inhabitants (in 1,000) 
Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning (2009) 
Innovation subsidies  Granted loans (in €1,000) by the KfW Bankengruppe 
(German Development Bank) to support innovation 
divided by inhabitants 
Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning (2009) 
Industry intensity vari-
ables 
 Firms per industry divided by all firms; 9 categories 
(communications, manufacturing, instruments, trans-
portation equipment, electronics, industrial machinery, 
fabricated metals, chemicals, textile mills) 
Bureau van Dijk (2010) 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean Median S. d. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
Number of granted patents 18.4 7 52.69 0 743 10.19 127.48
Log (number of granted patents) 2.11 2.08 1.21 0 6.61 0.32 3.14
Patenting intensity 0.76 0.44 1.09 0 9.55 4.07 25.30
Log (patenting intensity) 0.46 0.37 0.40 0 2.36 1.62 6.36
Family firm intensity 0.08 0.05 0.10 0 0.67 2.17 10.27
Large public firm intensity 0 0.015 0.04 0 0.39 4.29 30.15
Inhabitants (in 10,000) 20.15 15.05 17.25 3.55 173.48 4.02 28.41
Population balance -0.17 -0.20 2.06 -5.90 6.5 0.07 3.2
GDP per employed person 56.00 54.65 7.33 39.5 116.2 2.65 17.85
Household income 1,480.94 1,456.50 153.85 1,203.00 2,200.00 1.14 5.45
Unemployment rate 6.33 6.15 1.86 3.00 13.5 0.80 3.71
Start-up rate 1.73 1.66 0.33 1.00 3.07 1.05 4.59
Firm density 10.60 4.13 13.27 0.87 95.54 2.28 9.92
R&D employee rate 9.51 5.70 11.75 0 85.1 2.94 13.92
Students rate 20.54 0.20 41.47 0 235.3 2.76 10.92
Innovation subsidies 0.05 0.02 0.08 0 0.59 3.40 17.96
Textile mills intensity 0.01 0 0.03 0 0.20 4.73 27.53
Chemicals intensity 0.03 0 0.04 0 0.29 2.30 11.12
Fabricated metals intensity 0.06 0.05 0.07 0 0.67 2.80 20.77
Electronics intensity 0.03 0.01 0.04 0 0.30 2.36 10.98
Transportation equipment intensity 0.02 0 0.04 0 0.20 2.43 9.39
Instruments intensity 0.01 0 0.03 0 0.24 3.77 21.46
Manufacturing intensity 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.22 4.79 30.98
Communications intensity 0.00 0 0.01 0 0.06 6.17 44.34
 
N=326 districts; S. d.=Standard deviation 
Data sources: Fritsch and Brixy (2004), Maraut et al. (2008), Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (2009), 
Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2010), Bureau van Dijk (2010) 
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Table 3: Correlations 
 
  Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) VIF 
(1) Number of granted patents      
(2) Log (number of granted patents) 0.57                       
(3) Log (patenting intensity) 0.57 0.84                      
(4) Family firm intensity 0.03 0.21 0.22                    1.65 
(5) Large public firm intensity 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.02                   1.68 
(6) Population in 10,000 0.57 0.56 0.19 -0.02 0.22                  1.48 
(7) Population balance 0.25 0.27 0.22 -0.04 0.18 0.22                 1.99 
(8) GDP per employed person in 1,000 EUR 0.38 0.51 0.48 0.04 0.46 0.32 0.30                1.93 
(9) Household Income 0.30 0.46 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.44               2.01 
(10) Uneployment rate -0.07 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19 -0.02 0.06 -0.41 -0.15 -0.38              2.62 
(11) Startup rate 0.19 0.10 0.17 -0.07 0.20 0.09 0.35 0.24 0.28 0.15             1.67 
(12) Firm density 0.51 0.38 0.34 -0.07 0.28 0.43 0.22 0.38 0.25 0.41 0.48            2.93 
(13) R&D employee rate 0.40 0.45 0.53 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.39 0.21 -0.12 0.02 0.22           1.33 
(14) Students rate  0.13 0.17 0.19 -0.05 0.19 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.04 0.24 0.31 0.50 0.15          1.63 
(15) Innovation subsidies  0.02 0.15 0.19 0.31 0.05 -0.07 0.10 0.04 0.18 -0.24 0.00 -0.06 0.13 -0.05         1.27 
(16) Textile mills intensity -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 0.08        1.04 
(17) Chemicals intensity  0.04 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.10 -0.10 0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.04       1.13 
(18) Fabricated metals intensity -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.42 -0.08 -0.04 -0.19 -0.13 0.06 -0.20 -0.26 -0.20 -0.06 -0.15 0.15 0.07 -0.07      1.45 
(19) Industrial machinery intensity -0.02 0.10 0.15 0.21 -0.13 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 0.05 -0.06 0.22 -0.01 -0.14 0.07     1.20 
(20) Electronics intensity  -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.22 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.11 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10 0.08 -0.08 0.16 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.05    1.15 
(21) Transportation equipment intensity -0.03 -0.10 -0.02 0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.02   1.08 
(22) Instruments intensity 0.03 0.17 0.14 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.20 -0.22 -0.04 -0.08 0.11 0.02 0.22 0.03 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.14 0.01  1.19 
(23) Miscellaneous manufacturing intensity -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.01 -0.12 0.11 0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 1.08 
(24) Communications intensity 0.14 0.19 0.16 -0.01 0.50 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.25 -0.01 0.27 0.27 0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 1.44 
Note: N=326 districts; absolute values larger than 0.11 are significant on a 5% level; VIF=variance inflation factor based on Model I in Table 4; correlations refer to the Pearson correlation coefficient. 
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Table 4: Regressions on innovation activity  
 
  Model I: OLS  
Model II: Neg. 
bin   Model III: OLS  
 Dependent variables 
Log (number of 
granted patents)  
Number of 
granted patents   
Log (patenting 
intensity)  
            
  Independent variables Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE    Coeff. SE   
Family firm indicator           
 Family firm intensity 1.04 (0.48) ** 1.20 (0.58) **  0.40 (0.19) ** 
Control variables      
 Large public firm intensity 1.38 (1.35)  0.89 (1.56)   0.78 (0.66)  
 Population in 10,000 0.03 (0.00) *** 0.03 (0.00) ***  0.00 (0.00)  
 Population balance -0.02 (0.03)  -0.01 (0.03)   -0.01 (0.01)  
 GDP per employed person in €1,000  0.03 (0.01) *** 0.03 (0.01) ***  0.01 (0.00) ** 
 Household income 0.65 (0.42)  1.03 (0.42) **  0.14 (0.16)  
 Unemployment rate -0.05 (0.03) ** -0.06 (0.03) **  -0.03 (0.01) ***
 Start-up rate -0.23 (0.17)  -0.39 (0.19) **  0.03 (0.06)  
 Firm density 0.01 (0.01) *** 0.02 (0.01) ***  0.01 (0.00) ***
 R&D employee rate 0.02 (0.01) *** 0.03 (0.01) ***  0.01 (0.00) ***
 Students rate 0.00 (0.00) * 0.00 (0.00) **  0.00 (0.00)  
 Innovation subsidies 0.31 (0.57)  0.20 (0.60)   0.08 (0.23)  
       
 Textile mills intensity 3.10 (1.97)  4.62 (2.21) **  1.19 (0.84)  
 Industrial machinery intensity 2.41 (0.64) *** 2.56 (0.76) ***  0.89 (0.23) ***
 Chemicals intensity 3.96 (1.12) *** 3.62 (1.08) ***  1.46 (0.52) ***
 Fabricated metals intensity 1.29 (0.84)  1.15 (0.98)   0.25 (0.30)  
 Electronics intensity 1.14 (1.16)  0.65 (1.32)   0.20 (0.41)  
 Transportation equipment intensity -2.43 (1.21) ** -2.90 (1.64) *  -0.53 (0.43)  
 Instruments intensity 1.07 (1.43)  0.48 (1.49)   0.10 (0.58)  
 Manufacturing intensity 1.80 (1.36)  1.34 (1.81)   0.52 (0.54)  
 Communications intensity 5.21 (8.15)  7.46 (8.82)   0.31 (3.49)  
       
  Constant -0.92 (0.73)    -1.36 (0.84)     -0.44 (0.26) * 
 Diagnostics      
 F-Test 21.59***   13.37*** 
 R² 0.62   0.51 
 Wald chi²  405.59***   
 Log pseudolikelihood -1,052.16  
  /lnalpha      -0.65 (0.10) ***        
 Notes: N = 326 observations. Robust standard errors (SE) in parentheses.       
 Significance levels: * 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1; ** 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01; two-sided tests.      
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Table 5: Robustness checks 
 
 
Model OLS Neg. bin.  OLS 
Dependent Variables Log (number of granted patents) 
Number of  
granted patents  
Log (patenting 
intensity) 
Robustness checks and variable of interest Coeff. SE   Coeff. SE    Coeff. SE   
East and West Germany combined (438 districts)           
   Family firm intensity 1.00 (0.47) ** 1.22 (0.56) **  0.43 (0.17) ***
 
Only districts < 500,000 inhabitants are used (309 districts)           
   Family firm intensity 0.87 (0.46) * 0.97 (0.57) *  0.38 (0.19) ** 
      
Note: 
N=326 districts; the same control variables as in Table IV are used; Robust standard errors (SE) in parentheses; significance 
levels: * 0.05 < p ≤ 0.1; ** 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01; two-sided tests. 
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Figures to be inserted in the text 
Figure 1: Geographic distribution of family firms in West Germany 
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Figure 2: Patenting intensity in West Germany 
 
 
